Introduction
Despite over two decades of a democratic government, contemporary Brazil is well known for its extremely high levels of everyday urban violence (Caldeira 2000; Costa 1998; Scheper-Hughes 1996; Zaluar 1995) . Numerous social and economic indicators associated with violence-such as unemployment, social and economic inequality, and lack of housing-have clearly not improved in Brazil since the transition from military dictatorship to democracy in 1984, and many have in fact worsened (Alvarez 1997; Bacchus 1990; Caldeira 2000; Pinheiro 1997) . The demographic group that is considered to be most widely engaged in violence, whether as victims or perpetrators, is youth, defined as the segment of the population between the ages of 15 to 24 (Cardia et al. 2003) . Brazil is by no means unique in this regard. Youth violence is a growing international concern, with reports of high levels emerging from countries including the United States, large regions of Africa, and parts of Southeast Asia. Indeed, since the middle of the 1990s, many international organizations and national governments have made youth violence a top policy priority, developing programs geared specifically to tackling the issue (Sawyer and Bowes 1999; WHO 2000 WHO , 2003 .
Although levels of international funding and institutionalized attention have increased significantly, programmatic initiatives are far from straightforward and can be best described as comprising contradictory ways of conceptualizing the causes and nature of youth violence, particularly when it pertains to young "perpetrators" of violence. In numerous countries, sociologists have documented an increase in vilifying attitudes toward youth violence, resulting from the growth of repressive juvenile justice and police enforcement systems. Backed by a growing body of scientific research in the field of youth criminology, these approaches tend to understand youth violence almost exclusively through a lens of denouncement and punishment Caldeira 2000) . The circulation of vilifying conceptualization not only support simplistic responses to violence based on assigning blame and imposing legal responsibility; they also readily denigrate a large segment of the youth population, often leading the nonviolent to become violent (Ferrándiz 2004; Spencer 2005; Watts and Erevelles 2004) .
Concurrently, medicalized approaches to violence have gained considerable prominence, in part as a response to the critique of vilification. Historians of medicine have shown that the creation of psychiatric diagnoses associated with violence, such as posttraumatic stress disorder, have at times enabled medical experts to rationalize the "irrationality" of violence, and thus, to respond to it in a more conciliatory way (Jones 1999; Fassin 2002; O'Shaughnessy 2004; Thomas and Penn 2002; Young 2002) . In many ways, this historical trend continues today. Several international organizations and national governments have developed programmatic approaches that encourage empathetic responses to youth violence as a way of avoiding the forms of victimization and vilification that are often associated with criminalization. In these instances, attempts to reduce youth violence are based on psychiatric and medical models of adolescent mental pathology and providing youth with socially sensitive psychosocial support and psychiatric therapy (Cooper and Singh 2000; Grunbaum et al. 2002; Sawyer and Bowes 1999; WHO 2000 WHO , 2003 .
At the same time that medicalization has taken hold, a substantial popular and academic literature-base argues that medicalization has more often than not negated the social, political, and moral dimensions of violence, reducing the problem to one of clinical pathology only. Furthermore, the creation of psychiatric categories such as "antisocial behavior" and "conduct disorder" have emerged from conceptual frameworks that generally attribute cause directly to individual-level attributes (see, e.g., Edwards et al. 2007; Fryer et al. 2007; Nigg and Breslau 2007) . Critics argue that by pathologizing violence in this way, solutions are in the best of situations relegated to the realm of psychological support, and in the worst of situations to the even more reductionistic pharmacological treatment of violence (Gilligan and Lee 2004) .
In recent years, a group of Brazilian "psi" professionals-as the psychological, psychiatric, social work, and pedagogic complex is frequently referred to (Russo 1993)-have developed responses to youth violence that are highly sensitive to both the critique of vilification and the critique of medicalization. Given the recent transition to democracy, psi experts have an added impetus to avoid repressive criminalizing measures. As such, the medicalization of violence in some parts of Brazil has partially developed as a counterpoint to the increase in repressive state-sponsored attitudes to youth violence. For example, a commonly ascribed-to view amongst members of the medical community in Brazil argues that the average practitioner must critically understand how youth violence is produced by the wider sociopolitical climate in order to avoid promulgating inappropriate gang-imbued stereotypes (Levisky 2001) .
